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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Appellant (hereinafter "Korn") lived in the City of Nampa, Canyon County, State of
Idaho prior to April of 2006. (Mot. Tr., pp. 5-6). While in Canyon County, Korn operated a zoo
at 1506 Happy Valley Road. Id. The zoo had an extensive collection of animals including
cranes, camels, zebras, exotic porcupines and tigers. (Mot. Tr., p. 7, L. 13-21). In 2002, Korn's
wife, Susan, moved from the Nampa property. (Mot. Tr., p. 8, L. 5-6). At that time, Susan
changed the addresses on the permits that Korn required to operate his zoo without Korn's
knowledge. (Mot. Tr., p. 8, L. 5-13). As a result, Korn did not receive the necessary permit
notices and he Jost his permits to operate the zoo. (Mot. Tr., p. 8, 1, 14-18).
In August of 2004, Susan filed rape charges against Korn. (Mot. Tr., p. 8, L. 22-25). The

rape charges were ultimately dismissed. (Mot. Tr., p. 37, L. 2-11). As a result of the false
charges, Korn was removed from the Nampa property. (Mot. Tr., p. 9, L. 1-3). When Korn was
again allowed back on the Nampa property, he discovered that several of the zoo animals were
missing. (Mot. Tr., p. 9, L. 10-19).
During 2004, Korn was involved in divorce litigation with Susan. (Mot Tr., p. 9, L. 1719). In the divorce case, Korn was ordered to remove the zoo animals from the Nampa property.

In November or December of 2004, Korn filed for bankruptcy protection. (Mot. Tr., p.

10, L. 1-7). In the course of the bankruptcy proceeding, a development company named DDR
purchased the real property in Nampa where Korn had maintained his zoo. (Mot. Tr., p. 10, L. 8-
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21). When DDR purchased the Nampa property, Korn started looking for alternative placement
for the zoo animals. (Mot. Tr., p. 11, L. 16-25). Korn spoke with representatives from the Boise
zoo about placing the animals, but the Boise zoo was not interested. (Mot. Tr., p. 11, L. 19-20).
Korn also looked for alternative placement for the animals in Owyhee County, Canyon County,
Boise County, and Payette County. (Mot. Tr., p. 12, L. 16-19). Ultimately, Korn decided to
relocate the animals to a property in Payette County (the "County"). (Mot. Tr., p. 13, L. 2-15).
At the time Korn decided to move the animals to the County, he checked the Payette
County ordinances with his realtor. (Mot. Tr., p. 14, L. 18-22). At that time, there was no
ordinance on the books that prohibited the housing of exotic animals in the County. (Mot., Tr.,
p. 14, L. 23-25).
Since Korn was in bankruptcy, he entered into a contract with his mother and DDR to
move the animals and house them in the County. Pursuant to the agreement, Korn's mother
would purchase the Payette County real property and invest $30,000 towards moving the animals
and building facilities for the animals in the County, and DDR would give Korn $50,000 to help
move the animals and construct facilities for the animals. (Mot. Tr., p. 15, L. 5-11 ). In exchange
DDR could take possession of the Nampa property more quickly and begin developing the
property for commercial use. As the project proceeded in the County, DDR put even more funds
into the Payette County facility, ultimately expending approximately $600,000.00. (Mot. Tr., p.
19, L. 14-19).
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While the Payette County facilities were being constructed, Korn was visited by a Payette
County Employee by the last name of Dressen. (Mot. Tr., p. 16, L. 2-5). Mr. Dressen advised
Korn that he needed to apply for a permit to build on the Payette County property. (Mot. Tr., p.
16, L. 8-12). Korn paid and applied for a site permit to continue his construction in the County.
(Mot. Tr., p. I 6, L. 14-15).
During the construction of the Payette County facilities, the Payette County
Commissioners passed an ordinance making it illegal to possess exotic animals in the County.
(Mot, Tr., p. I 7, L. 17-23). 1 By the time Korn was advised of the new ordinance, it was too late
to build a facility to house the animals someplace else. (Mot. Tr., p. 19, L. 7-10). Further, Korn
had been ordered by the Federal Bankruptcy Judge to move and Korn had been advised that ifhe
did not get the animals moved he would be in contempt of the Bankruptcy Court's orders. (Mot.
Tr., p. 18, L. 11-18).

The County filed charges against Korn for violating the newly enacted exotic animal
ordinance known as Payette County Ordinance 5-6-2, and for violating LC. § 25-3905 and
IDAPA 02.04.27.111. (See Criminal Complaint). Korn brought a pretrial Motion to Dismiss the
count brought against him for violating the Payette County ordinance on the grounds that the
County's enactment of the ordinance violated the contract clause of the Idaho and U.S.

1

In the Commissioner's Meeting Minutes, which were admitted at the hearing on Korn's
Motion to Dismiss, it states that the reason for the ordinance is that "there is a man wanting to
bring exotic animals to a place on Little Willow." In other words, the ordinance was enacted
specifically to affect Korn.
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Constitutions. The Court heard Korn's Motion to Dismiss on August 4, 2006, and denied the
same. (Mot. Tr., p. 39-40.
The cause proceeded to jury trial on August 24, 2006. (Trial Tr., p. 1). During the course
of the trial, and during the cross-examination of Korn, the Prosecutor gave Korn a copy of an
order from the Bankruptcy Court. (Trial Tr., p. 155-159). The Prosecutor asked Korn questions
about the order and both Korn and the Prosecutor read portions of the order to the jury. Id. On
redirect, defense counsel attempted to introduce the bankruptcy court orders, both the one
discussed by the Prosecutor and another one, into evidence.

(Trial Tr., p. 166-168). The

Prosecutor objected on the basis that the orders were not certified and the trial court sustained the
Prosecutor's objections. Id.
Ultimately, the jury found Korn guilty on both counts, Korn was sentenced and appealed
to the District Court for the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Payette. That appeal
was denied in an Appellate Decision by District Judge Renae J. Hoff, filed on December 12,
2007. This appeal followed.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial Court err by applying the wrong legal standard in denying Korn's pretrial

Motion to Dismiss?
2.

Did the trial Court err by failing to allow the admission of the bankruptcy court orders

into evidence at the jury trial?
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ARGUMENT
There are two issues on appeal and they will be address in turn.

A. DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR
Korn filed a Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint which alleged a violation of the
Payette County Ordinance 5-6-2 prohibiting the possession of exotic animals (the "Ordinance").
Korn argued that the passing of the Ordinance after he had entered into an agreement with his
mother and DDR (an agreement that was ratified by the bankruptcy court) to house the animals in
the County violated the contract clause of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions.

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court exercises free review over constitutional issues as they are purely
issues oflaw. Meisner v. Potlach Corp., 131 Idaho 258,260,954 P.2d 676,678 (1998). "In an
appeal from a final judgment of a magistrate judge following an appeal to a district jude sitting as
an appellate court, we [the Supreme Court] review the record of the magistrate judge
independently of the decision of the district judge." State v. Anderson, 2008 Idaho 34411
(Supreme Court 2008) (internal citations omitted).

2. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
The Idaho Constitution provides that, "[n]o ... law impairing the obligation of contracts
will ever be passed." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 16 (Lexis 2006). The U.S. Constitution provides
that, "[nJo state shall ... pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts .... " U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 10 (Lexis 2006). These clauses are known as the contract clauses.
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The Idaho Courts have historically recognized and enforced the provisions of the contract
clause. See e.g., Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993); Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho
437, 32 P.2d 843 (1934). In conducting an analysis under the Contract Clause, the Court must
first determine "'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a
contractual relationship."' Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S.
400, 411 (1983) (internal citations omitted). "Any enactment of a legislative character is said to
'impair' the obligation of a contract which attempts to take from a party a right to which he is
entitled by its terms, or which deprives him of the means of enforcing such a right .... " Curr,
124 Idaho at 692, 864 P.2d at 138.

If the State's regulation constitutes a substantial impairment

on a party's contract rights, then the State must justify its actions by showing that there is a
"significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation." Energy Reserves Grp., Inc.,
459 U.S. at 411. "[T]he next inquiry is whether the adjustments of 'the rights and responsibilities
of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to
the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption."' Id at 412. Finally, in Sanderson v.
Salmon River Canal Co., 45 Idaho 244 (1927), at 256, the Supreme Court held that "the general

rule would seem to be that a statute which does not act on the contract itself but merely on the
property which is the subject of the contract may not be said to impair the obligation of the
contract. The value of the contract may be diminished, but the obligation of the parties to each
other is not affected in the slightest degree[.] (internal citations omitted) Nor does every statute
which affects the value of a contract impair its obligation. It is one of the contingencies to which
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parties look now in making a large class of contracts that they may be affected in many ways by
state and national legislation."
3. ANALYSIS
The trial court denied Korn's Motion to Dismiss and ruled as follows:

In your motion to dismiss, you cited Energy Reserves Group versus Canada Power

and Light, 459 US 400. And that case states that first, whether state law has in
fact operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship and
assuming all the evidence that you presented is correct, that it's true, there may
possibly be an impairment of a contractual relationship and I'm not ruling on
whether or not that's a legal relationship or that contract is valid or not. But then
Energy Resources goes on to say if a substantial impairment is found, the State
justification must have a significant legitimate public purpose behind the
regulation. It's clear to me that Payette County has a significant and legitimate
public purposes behind the regulation of exotic animals. Contrary to what Mr.
Korn may assert, it's clear that exotic animals can be dangerous. And they - and
the county certainly has a legitimate public purpose in their regulation.
Furthermore, under Kerr versus Kerr, 124 Idaho 686, specifically in footnote 3,
the Idaho Supreme Court said that impairment of a contract is an intent by the
state to take from a party the right to which he is entitled to by its terms or which
deprives him of the means of enforcing such right. I cannot find, as a matter of
law, that Mr. Korn is entitled to keep exotic animals in Payette County. He has to
have permits from the State. He has to have permits from the federal government.
He doesn't have any of those permits. I fail to see that anything that Payette
County did is an impairment of any contract whatsoever. Based on that and based
on Energy Resource Group versus Kansas Power and Light and Kerr versus Kerr,
the Court's denying the motion to dismiss.
(Mot. Tr., pp. 39-40).
The trial court's analysis does not follow the analysis set forth by the appellate courts as
outlined above. In a contract clause analysis, the first step is for the Court to determine whether
the Ordinance substantially impairs a contractual relationship.
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In this case, Korn had a

contractual right to have his mother and DDR construct a facility for the animals and house them
in the County. While the facility was being built, and after issuing Korn a site permit for the
building, the County enacted an ordinance that made the facility worthless to Korn since he could
not house his animals there. In effect the County deprived Korn of the benefit of a $600,000.00
facility which could not be duplicated due to orders of the federal Bankruptcy Court that ratified
Korn's, his mother's and DDR's agreement initially. It is clear that the answer to the first step of
the contract clause analysis is that the County substantially impaired Korn's contractual rights.
The argument that Korn had no legal right to said contract due to the lack of appropriate state and
federal permits is irrelevant since the Ordinance at issue makes no exception for the possession
of such permits and the lack of such permits is not an element of the crime. As the trial Judge's
jury instructions make clear, the lack of the possession of any such permit is not an element of

the crime charged and moved under the Motion to Dismiss, the violation of Payette County
Ordinance 5-6-2, but rather is for the other charged crime, the violation of Idaho Code Section
25-3905. (Trial Tr., p. 180-187)
The further argument that Korn' s contract rights were not substantially impaired under
the standard articulated in Sanderson, is not applicable here. Sanderson dealt with a lien placed
on land for water right payments that took priority over, but did not vitiate, the complainant's
mortgage rights on said lands. The statute at issue here placed no burden on the land, but rather
flatly denied Korn the right to keep the animals on the property for which he had entered into his
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various contracts, making the contracts and the property improvements with respect to the land
essentially worthless.
At this point the burden shifts to the County to show a significant and legitimate public
purpose behind the regulation. The County indicates that there is a significant and legitimate
public purpose served by the Ordinance in that the ordinance protects people from dangerous
exotic animals.

The problem with this assertion is that the testimony at the hearing on the

Motion to Dismiss indicated that the animals were not dangerous and no evidence was presented
by the County to show otherwise. Further, the minutes from the Payette County Commissioner's
meetings make it clear that this Ordinance was designed to keep Korn out of the County. There
is no indication that there had been any problems with exotic animals in the County. In fact,
Korn testified at the hearing that other people in the County had previously possessed exotic
animals including an alligator (Mot. Tr., p. 37, L. 8-21), emus, rheas, ostriches, python, goboon
vipers, womas, blackheads, green bum, and other poisonous or "hot" reptiles. (Mot. Tr., p. 3738). The trial court jumped to a conclusion not based upon the evidence presented at the hearing
and concluded that Kom's animals "can be dangerous." The trial court ignored, however, the fact
that the Ordinance was enacted to address Korn coming into the county and there was no proof
that Korn's animals were dangerous or that the animals addressed in the ordinance were
dangerous. Accordingly, the County failed to establish a significant and legitimate interest in
enacting the Ordinance.
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significant and legitimate interest in regulating the animals at issue here without any evidence in
the record to support that finding and said finding should be overturned as clearly erroneous.
Even if the County had established a significant and legitimate interest, the County's
actions in enacting the Ordinance affected the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties
in a way that is not based upon reasonable conditions. Further, the Ordinance's effects were not
of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the Ordinance's adoption. In other
words, the County could have enacted an Ordinance that provided for guidelines that Korn would
have to follow to keep the animals in the County. By doing so, Korn would have been able to
enjoy the benefits of his agreement and the County could still regulate the animals and protect the
citizens of the County.

B. DENIAL OF ADMISSION OF APPELLANT'S BANKRUPTCY ORDERS WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR
During the course of the jury trial, one of the issues was whether or not the Bankruptcy
Court had ordered Korn to move to the County. If so, Korn would have acted out of necessity
and could not have been found guilty of the alleged violations of law. Korn attempted to prove
that he had been ordered to move to the County by introducing two Bankruptcy Court orders into
evidence, to wit: defense Exhibits E and F. The Prosecutor objected to the admission of the
exhibits on the grounds that the orders were not certified and the trial court sustained the
objections.
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1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court should" ... only disturb a trial court's discretion to admit evidence ...

upon 'a clear showing of abuse."' State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 911 (2003) (citations
omitted).

"Even if the [trial] court used its discretion in error, such error, alone, does not

constitute grounds for reversal." Id "Unless an error 'affects substantial rights' of the parties it
should be disregarded." Id. (citations omitted). "An error is harmless if the [appellate] Court is
unable to say, 'beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result
absent the error.' The burden of showing prejudicial error rests on the party asserting such error."

Id.
2. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

"Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on the admissibility of evidence before
them." Sandoval-Tena, at 911.
"Physical items ... must be authenticated before they may be admitted into evidence. Rule
901 provides that '[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent
to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what its proponent claims.' Further Rule 901 provides that, authentication may be presented,
for example, through the testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is
claimed to be." Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 738 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations
omitted). A copy of a court order does not have to be certified in order to be admitted into
evidence.

If a court order is certified it is self authenticating and does not require further
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evidentiary foundation to prove what it is. I.RE. 902(4) (Lexis 2006). However, authentication
may be accomplished in other ways. "The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what its proponent claims." I.R.E. 901(a) (Lexis 2006). "By way of
illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or
identification conforming with the requirements of this rule ... [t]estimony of a witness with
knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 901(b)(l) (Lexis 2006).
Proof of a chain of custody is not a separate requirement for admissibility. State v. Fee,
124 Idaho 170, 175 (Ct. App. 1993). "Ordinarily, the party offering an exhibit establishes its
chain of custody in order to create a presumption that it was not materially altered. If the chain
of custody has been broken, however, the party can still rely upon other evidence to show a lack
of material alteration." State v. Crook, 98 Idaho 383, 384 (1977). The standard for admissibility
of evidence is whether the trial court can determine, in all reasonable probability, the proffered
exhibit has not been changed in any material respect. State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 757
(1992). Generally, in laying a proper foundation for admission of evidence the practicalities of
proof do not require the prosecution to negate all possibilities of substitution or tampering.
Dach/et v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 756 (2002).

3.ANALYSIS
Korn attempted to enter into evidence two Exhibits, specifically Defense Exhibits E and
F, which are orders from the Bankmptcy Court and which were necessary to provide the evidence
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to support Korn's defense claim that he was acting, in moving the animals at issue in this case to
the County, by necessity.
In the case of Exhibit E, Korn was asked if he recognized it while testifying and he said
"Yes, sir." (Trial Tr., pp 165-166). There was no evidence of any kind introduced to call into
question his identification of the document. It clearly, under the standard of Kodesh and I.R.E.
90l(b)(l), should have been admitted into evidence. The next question is whether such error is
harmless. I will address that question for both documents at the end of this section.

In the case of Exhibit F, there was a great deal of testimony by Korn about the document.
While it is true that when asked about Exhibit F by the Prosecutor, Korn said, "Sir, I saw so
many of those, I honestly don't know which one it is you have," (Trial Tr., p. 156) he had not yet
been shown the document. The Prosecutor did not seek leave to approach Korn and show him
Exhibit F until after that exchange. (Trial Tr., p. 156) Once Mr. Korn was shown the document
and asked by his own Attorney what it was, he readily identified it, (Trial Tr., p. 167-168)
thereby providing a proper authentication under the standard of Kodesh and I.R.E. 901(b)(J).
Further, the Prosecutor elicited lengthy testimony from Korn about Exhibit F (see Trial Tr., pp.
155-159), and during said testimony the Prosecutor asserted various things about Exhibit F, such
as "I don't see where it orders you to move to Payette County" (Trial Tr., p. 156), "You're not
ordered to do anything there" (Trial Tr., p. 157) and "That order authorizes the release of funds.
It does not say those animals shall be removed to Payette County. At least I don't read that."

(Trial Tr., p. 158). Such lengthy testimony, elicited by the Prosecutor and including various
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assertions about the document, should be sufficient to provide proper authentication under the
standard of Kodesh and I.R.E. 90l(b)(l).
In the case of Exhibit E, the jury heard Korn testify to its title, source and subject. (Trial
Tr., p. 166). With respect to Exhibit F, the jury heard a great deal of testimony by Korn as to it,
as well as a great many Prosecutorial assertions as to what it was. (Trial Tr., pp. 155-159). While
the jury was able to hear some short statements by Korn with respect to Exhibit E's nature and
the lengthier colloquy about Exhibit F, it is a very different level of proof to hear a defendant
stating something and to be handed a written court order which says the same thing or something
similar. While a jury may question the validity of the verbal testimony of a defendant, especially
when the prosecutor makes assertions about the Exhibit, during his cross-examination, that tend
to call into question the accuracy of the defendant's testimony, they will not so question an order
by a court. Korn was simply unable to make a convincing claim of necessity when he was not
allowed to introduce into evidence the very documents that were the cause of the claim, though
properly authenticated, while simultaneously having his claim about those documents challenged
by the Prosecutor during cross-examination. In such a situation, the error can not be harmless
and the standard of Sandoval-Tena, at 911, is met. The Court simply can not say beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same conclusion absent the error.
CONCLUSION

The trial court failed to properly analyze the evidence and apply the proper legal standard
of analysis of the contract clause claim made by Korn in his Motion to Dismiss. Given the
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significant impairment of Korn's contract rights with his mother and DDR, the lack of any
evidence of any kind to support a finding of a significant and legitimate reason for the County to
impair his contract rights, and the entire lack of any analysis of any kind with respect to the
reasonableness of the County's legal enactment and enforcement, this Court should find that
Korn' s contract rights have been violated and reverse the trial court's decision and dismiss Count
I of the Criminal Complaint herein on constitutional grounds as violations of the Idaho Const.
Art. I,§ 16 and the U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 10.
The trial court erred in that it refused the admission of Defense Exhibits E and F, though
they were properly authenticated and absolutely necessary to Korn successfully making his claim
of necessity. This Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for a
new trial.

DATED this

\1~

day of October, 2008.

Kclt!I, ~Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, Jerome Korn
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1th,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \
day of October, 2008, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be delivered to Jennifer Berkin, Deputy
Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 by US mail, postage prepaid and
by facsimile at (208) 854-8074.

Danelle Bezates
Assistant to Kelly Whiting
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